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Abstract 
Environmental uncertainty has particular ramifications for programs that seek 
the benefits of interdependent coordinated action.  This research examined the 
influence of a number of interdependencies on major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) performance.  The analysis found that interdependencies, when defined by 
“joint status,” “number of program elements,” or “number of data connections,” do 
not appear to exhibit any ill-toward effects.   
However, the results of the analysis illustrated that programs exert cascading 
influences on neighboring programs.  The examination of whether MDAPs that share 
a program element influence each other was supported.  Upstream program 
acquisition unit cost (PAUC) growth appeared to influence both downstream PAUC 
growth and downstream engineering cost variance.  The upstream program’s 
engineering cost variance influence was mixed, demonstrating positive results in one 
network but negative results in the other. Upstream average procurement unit cost 
(APUC) growth exerted negative influences on downstream PAUC percent growth in 
one network and negative influences on engineering cost variance in the other 
network, thereby suggesting some type of economies of scale benefits.  The finding 
that upstream PAUC growth had a consistent and positive influence on downstream 
PAUC growth was especially revealing.  These findings illustrate that interdependent 
organizations are susceptible to the performance shortfalls of their partners.   
Keywords: Interdependent organizations, major defense acquisition program 
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I. Introduction 
In a world of insurgent and asymmetrical warfare, no defense organization is 
an island.  While the Services have engaged in a host of coordinated efforts in the 
past, the need for situational awareness and rapid response rates demand the 
synergistic benefits that only wide-scale cross-integration and interoperability 
affords.  Never in the history of the DoD has the rapid fielding of flexible and 
adaptive technology for countering unconventional and time-sensitive threats been 
more important.  
This research examines DoD acquisition from the context of a network of 
interrelated programs that exchange and share resources for the purpose of 
establishing joint capabilities.  The research focuses on the joint space of major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs): the space where transactions form 
interdependencies among MDAP programs.  The research is especially salient 
because, to date, little is known about the risks associated with interdependent 
activities.  
Unfortunately, by and large, the literature on interdependent activities is 
steeped in contradictory findings.  For example, some argue that tight-knit 
arrangements are more likely to have the social traction needed to overcome 
environmental difficulties (Sosa, 2011), whereas others argue that loose coupling, or 
weak ties, may be a better solution (Granovetter, 1973).  Some claim that more 
information is the key to benefit attainment (Comfort, 1994), whereas others claim 
that more information leads to a false sense of security (Hall, Ariss & Todorov, 
2007). Yet, despite the absence of consistent sage advice, resource limitations and 
a demand for comprehensive solutions continue to push organizations toward 
complex structures for the delivery of products and services.   
For this research, jointness, interdependency, exchange, and partnerships all 
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relationships to obtain resources to provide capabilities that, when looked at in 
totality, form network structures. While it is true that at the individual pair-wise level, 
these exchanges exist as explicit transactions for the transfer of data, labor, capital, 
or materials, it is also true that the totality of the various dimensions, coupled with 
the turbulence of perturbations, influences the cost, schedule, and performance of 
the acquisition effort.  
Organizations in the past sought to limit interdependencies to maintain control 
over the environment.  More recently, however, organizations have sought to 
leverage the benefits that interdependencies, or partnerships, can provide.  Thus, 
discussions of the nature of structure and how to best organize in the face of 
increasing needs for holistic comprehensive solutions has taken center stage.  The 
key question seems to be whether organizations can benefit from interdependence 
while minimizing the negative influences of environmental turbulence.  The question 
thus becomes, what structural arrangements and behavioral practices are conducive 
to achieving the benefits of coordinated actions?   
This research examines the role that interdependent activities play in 
delivering products on time and on budget.  In short, it seeks to identify the role that 
environmental turbulence plays in the pursuit of coordinated activities.  The study of 
environmental uncertainty and turbulence is especially pivotal because organizations 
often seek to forego the benefits of partnerships, or coordinated activities, to 
eliminate the risk of environmental uncertainty.  The following section provides a 
short overview on organizational interdependencies and network analysis.  The 
discussion then segues into an examination of environmental uncertainty and 
adaptive capacity. The research methodology follows, and the findings of the 
empirical analyses are presented.  While much is left to be learned, the research 
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II. Interdependent Networks 
A novice’s glance into the field of interdependent organizational-based 
networks is likely to reveal a terminological jungle of abstract and obscure 
vocabulary.  This section of the report seeks to convey many of the more common 
network terms and place them in the context of DoD acquisition.  Table 1 provides a 
glossary of several of the key terms.  At the onset, it is important to recognize that 
the term social is used in a specific empirical context for understanding 
programmatic interactions: “social systems of interaction” form the basis from which 
material equipment and organizational capacities get things done (Turner, 1988. 
Table 1. Common Network Terms 
Common Network Terms 
Node: a person, team, organization, computer, etc. in a network 
Tie: a connection between two nodes 
Directed Network: a network where the tie is directional in nature 
Undirected Network: a network where the ties are not directional 
Ego: refers to the subject of the discourse 
Alter: refers to the node that the ego has ties with 
Ego Network: refers to the network in light of a given ego 
Dyad: two nodes linked into a pair. Networks can be decomposed into their 
dyads, or pairs. 
Structuralist Paradigm: sees the network structure as the defining characteristic 
of n individual node’s behavior. By extension, two nodes that share structurally 
similar characteristics will witness similar outcomes. 
Connectionist Paradigm: The focus is on the resources that flow through the ties; 
the ties act as conduits for the flow of resources 
Diffusion: Is a measure of the spread of an innovation or characteristic 
throughout the network 
Social Capital: The primary focus of Connectionist paradigm is primarily 
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success as a function of these ties. 
Structural Capital: The primary focus of the Structuralist paradigm is primarily 
concerned with the position of nodes in a network and how this influences 
outcomes. 
Centrality: the extent to which a given node(s) dominates the number of ties.  
When only a few nodes have a large number of ties compared to the others, the 
network is viewed as highly centralized. 
Structural Equivalence: Actors (or nodes) are structurally equivalent to the extent 
that they are similar in their ties. 
Relational Embeddedness: relates to the quality and depth of a single dyadic tie 
Structural Embeddedness: relates to the extent to which a given node’s alters are 
interconnected 
Geodesic Distance: represents how far one node is from another.  It is often 
represented as how near or far a node is from another. 
Closure : Is a measure of the number of triads (or connections among three 
nodes) that exist in the network 
Structural Hole: A hole in the network that a node could bridge and thus act as a 
go-between. In this way, they can often control the two nodes that they connect. 
Broker: Per the definition of structural hole, a broker spans two or more 
subnetworks. 
Multiplex Ties: when a given node connects with another node in multiple 
networks.  For example, a node may be connected to another node in both a 
funding network and a data-sharing network. 
Homophily / Heterophily: indicates the extent to which one node is similar to 
another on key characteristics 
Degree Distribution: the variance in the distribution of ties in a network 
Network Connectivity: reflects the “size” of the network by the longest path from 
one node to another 
Network Density: the proportion of ties in a network relative to the total number 
possible 
Pattern of Clustering: refers to the absence or presence of subnetworks 
Degree Assortativity: reflects the degree to which nodes with a similar number of 
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Cohesion: the degree to which nodes are connected directly to each other.  
Under low cohesion, a number of cliques (or subnetworks) will be observed. 
Bridge: a tie that is critical to the connectivity of the network.  Elimination of the 
bridge is likely to result in a large number of factions. 
Path Length: the length from one node to another.  Typically measured in terms 
of how many nodes are in between the two.   
Wasserman and Faust (1994) defined the social network perspective as a 
focus on the relationships that exist among entities and the patterns and implications 
of these relationships. Overall, the vantage point is that  
 actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent, autonomous units; 
 relational ties between actors are channels for the transfer of 
resources; and 
 network models view the structural environment as providing 
opportunities for, or constraints on, individual and collective action 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 3–4). 
Organizations have long been viewed as resource exchanging agents.  When 
considered in this light, each organization takes input and converts it into outputs 
that are then provided as inputs to another organization. Nonetheless, in the past, 
organizations often sought to maintain control over practices and procedures by 
restricting access to outside influences.  Hierarchical organizational models were 
pursued because they provided stability.  But the hierarchical approach was found to 
be ill-suited to situations in which needs and demands evolved.  Hierarchical 
approaches, due to their inability to adapt, risked the obsolescence that occurred 
from the inability to adapt to changing needs. 
Over the years, researchers have consistently found that demand uncertainty 
is a key contributor to the choice to forego hierarchical-based approaches in favor of 
organizational networks.  Demand uncertainty arises when organizations lack the 
ability to predict near-future needs.  When organizations are confronted with high 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
service delivery and production cycles—shifts that a hierarchical approach cannot 
accommodate.  Because networks offer an expanded set of options, they allow the 
ability to respond to a wider range of contingencies.  For example, under asymmetric 
warfare conditions, the types of solutions that may be required are difficult to predict 
a priori.  Given the uncertainty of the demands of the battle-space, warriors require a 
wide arsenal of alternative and complementary approaches—approaches that must 
be accessible at a moment’s notice.  When demand uncertainty is low, organizations 
often choose more simplistic hierarchical approaches.  Under high demand 
uncertainty, organizations require the ability to leverage a variety of capabilities 
irrespective of the boundaries of a give organization’s purview (Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997).  
In the work setting, network actors (or nodes) often represent people, teams, 
or organizations.  A tie represents some form of interaction or relationship.  In short, 
network structures provide the “plumbing” for the flow of resources through the 
network.  
Interdependent networks are complicated by the fact that they are 
multidimensional, and as such, understanding their behavior requires consideration 
of multiple levels of analysis.  Typically, networks can be characterized in light of 
four basic levels: the individual, the subnetwork(s), the entire network, or as a 
multiplex network.  A multiplex perspective considers the node from a multi-network 
consideration.  For example, in this report, major defense acquisition program 
(MDAPs) are examined in light of the performance of the individual program as well 
as its resulting performance in two different networks: (1) a data-sharing network 
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Figure 2. Ego Network 
A directed network is one where the flow of resources moves in a specific 
direction, either inbound to an ego or outbound from an ego (see Figure 3).  For 
example, the data-sharing network identified previously is a directed network 
because the data flow from one program to another.  A directed network can be 
either sequential or reciprocal in nature.  Alternatively, an undirected network is one 
that is “pooled” in nature.  In other words, the nodes share a common connection 
(i.e., a budget), but there is no directional component to the tie.  In this case, the tie 
indicates that the two programs share a common budget.  
 
Figure 3. Directed Network and Undirected Network 
A node is labeled as a broker when it connects two distinct subnetworks. So 
in Figure 4, Program Number 554 Multifunctional Information Distribution System 
Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS JTRS) acts as a broker between three 
subnetworks.  An isolate is a node with no ties.  Again, in Figure 4, Program Number 
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transmitter, a receiver, or a carrier.  A bridge is identified when a tie spans two 
subnetworks.  Structural equivalence occurs when two nodes are structurally similar 
(see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 4. A Broker and an Isolate  
 
Figure 5. Structural Equivalence 
Relying on matrix algebra, a number of metrics have been devised throughout 
the years to measure networks.  Some of the metrics occur at the node or ego level, 
and others are at the subnetwork or whole-network levels.  Nodes are often 
considered in light of their position, or role, in the network.  Many of the ego-level 
metrics are calculated relative to others in the network.   
The degree of a node is the number of ties that a node exhibits.  These ties 
can be measured as inbound or outbound (or both) in a directed network.  Another 
measure is the geodesic distance that one node may be from another.  Adjacency 
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capable of connecting by way of other nodes.  Degree centrality identifies the 
number of ties that a node possesses.  The more ties relative to others, the greater 
the centrality.  Closeness, on the other hand, indicates how close a given node is to 
the remaining nodes.  When all of the nodes are close to all of the other nodes, the 
interaction level among the nodes is typically high.   
Network size is often calculated as the sum of the number of nodes or 
number of ties (see Figure 6).  Sometimes networks (or subnetworks) are measured 
by their longest, or shortest, path.  The bridge identified previously is often of interest 
because it indicates that if the tie between the two nodes can be cut, the network 
can be disconnected or reduced to its subnetworks.  The same holds true for the 
broker.  If a broker is eliminated, the network will be reduced to a number of 
subnetworks.  Node connectivity identifies the minimum number of nodes that have 
to be removed to disconnect the network. Betweenness is the extent to which a 
given node lies between other nodes and, thus, could act to facilitate or block the 
flow of resources. 
 
Figure 6.  
Density refers to the proportion of ties relative to the absolute total. Relational 
embeddedness refers to the quality and depth of a single dyadic tie. Structural 
embeddedness refers to the extent to which a node’s alters are connected to each 
other. Because structural embeddedness reflects the degree of the interactions, it is 
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In the study of networks, scholars often take either a structural or a 
connectionist approach.  Structural approaches examine the structure of the network 
and its influence on key variables of interest.  Connectionists, on the other hand, 
focus on the flows between the nodes.  Those who study social capital tend to focus 
on the possibilities of actions that social ties provide.  Others, however, tend to be 
more concerned with diffusion and the dynamics of network change over time.  Still, 
other studies focus on why and how networks develop, how and why they change 
over time, and finally, what influences they exert.  Social capital is mostly studied at 
the individual level, and diffusion is observed from the perspective of the entire 
network.   
Studies of the influence of dyadic ties on performance have mixed and 
contradictory findings.  For example, Perry-Smith and Shalley (2003) found that 
weak ties led to creativity, but others claim that strong ties are more advantageous 
(Sosa, 2011).  Others claim that it is not the number of ties but rather the depth of 
the engagement that matters.  No one would be surprised by the idea that relative to 
fewer ties, more ties may provide organizations with better information that might 
promote enhanced decision-making.  At the same time, information overload and 
difficulties with scrubbing data to provide information at the proper specification level 
has become a real problem for many managers.   
Similarly, studies of embeddedness are equally contradictory.  According to 
some, the more each node knows about the others, the more constraints there are 
on each other’s behaviors.  This is often seen as a positive.  Parties gather 
information on whom to avoid as well as potential opportunities and synergies.  
Structural embeddedness allows the use of sanctions since knowledge of 
misfeasance influences reputational value.  But these constraints can backfire and 
actually restrict flexibility. Too much embeddedness can also create problems.  It 
can lead to feuding, group think, and welfare support of weak members.  Social 
aspects such as restricting access to exchanges, imposing collective sanctions, and 
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Apparently, networks and ties matter, but the extent of the influence is highly 
debatable.  
Much of the incongruity in the findings may be due to the difficulties 
associated with measurement and data collection. Researchers are challenged by 
the burden of the data collection requirements, and organizations are often 
frustrated by the extent of the data request.  Because multilevel data are needed for 
each specific relationship, the data collection task can be onerous. Moreover, given 
that the study of networks is a fairly new phenomenon, typical organizational records 
often lack insights at a network level. When multilevel data are obtained, an analysis 
of variance statistical technique termed hierarchical linear modeling or multilevel 
modeling is often employed because it allows the examination of multiple units of 
analysis simultaneously.   
Despite these contradictory findings and data collection difficulties, the 
examination of networks and ties that manifest as interdependencies is likely to 
provide substantial insights into a number of issues.  First, when considering cost 
and affordability, examining a program in isolation of the entire value chain is likely 
to provide erroneous information.  Second, a wealth of research illustrates the 
importance of risk management.  Considering the risks of a given program without 
considering its interdependencies may underestimate the true risk level.  Next, in the 
decision of a start-up or termination, it is essential to know how the inclusion or 
removal of a program will influence its n-order neighbors. Finally, network conditions 
may exert powerful influences over program sustainability. 
The following discussion explores the issue of environmental uncertainty and 
its potential effects on network performance.  As mentioned, under demand 
uncertainty, network forms of organization appear attractive.  However, they also 
expose the organization to the uncertainties associated with environmental 
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A. Environmental Uncertainty 
Over half a century ago, scholars noted that organizations were not immune 
to the uncertainty of shifting environmental conditions.  Thompson (1967),  March 
and Simon (1958) all wrote extensively about the role of the environment on 
organizational performance.  The general concern was that environmental 
turbulence created an inability to accurately predict resource shifts, thereby leaving 
the organization at risk.  Others identified that it was not necessarily the rate of 
change, or the degree of the change, that created the problem as much as it was the 
unpredictability of the change that created the greatest turmoil (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1973; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974; Milliken, 1987). Apparently, disruptive events 
surface in the way of “shifts,” “steady turbulence,” and “jolts.”  All three of these 
occurrences demand adjustments and adaptation. 
Milliken’s (1987) work illustrated that there are at least three different types of 
uncertainty: state, response, and effect. He defined state uncertainty as “the 
situation that occurs when managers do not feel confident that they understand what 
the major events or trends in an environment are or feel unable to accurately assign 
probabilities to the likelihood that particular events or changes will occur.”  
Conversely, response uncertainty characterizes an inability to predict the likely 
consequences of a given choice.  Effect uncertainty is characterized by an inability 
to predict the nature of the effect on the organization’s future state.   
Most of the research suggested that organizations take deliberate, intentional, 
and rational steps to eliminate environmental flux and to regain equilibrium.  In 1969, 
Herbert Simon identified that organizations rely on three different modes to regain 
stability: passive insulation, reactive negative feedback, and predictive adaptation. 
Thompson (1967) argued that organizations used “buffering” techniques such as 
rational planning, standard operating procedures, industry standards, and contracts 
to minimize flux.  All of these behaviors seek to absorb environmental uncertainty. 
Thompson’s (1967) research found that organizations attempt to buffer the technical 
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technical core to regain equilibrium. Where buffering seeks to absorb environmental 
fluctuation, smoothing or leveling seeks to reduce fluctuations in the environment.  
Smoothing involves active intervention by the organization to stabilize the 
environment, and Cyert and March (1963) called attention to the importance of slack 
resources in protecting the organization from environmental flux.  
Milliken (1987) argued that the most effective strategies for dealing with 
environmental turbulence depend on the type of uncertainty. Whether the 
uncertainty is rooted in state, effects, or response may mandate different 
approaches to buffering and the type of slack resources required to maintain stability 
in the face of turbulence. 
For an organization that wishes to maintain stability, Miles and Snow (1978) 
recommended an organizational structure that focused on functional divisions, 
centralized control, long-looped vertical information systems, and conflict resolution 
via hierarchical channels. For organizations that wish to promote flexibility, they 
recommended low division of labor, decentralized control, short-looped horizontal 
information systems, and resolution through integrators.  
More recently, scholars have called attention to the ill-toward effects of 
strategies that promote stability via isolation strategies. They claimed that isolating 
the organization from the environment can lead to diminished capacities.  With this 
realization came the knowledge that agencies that were capable of improving 
performance by leveraging external resources, while also protecting themselves 
from the turbulence of uncertainty, realized substantial performance gains. 
Following this thread, others found that organizations actually interacted with 
the environment in a manner to gain power, manipulate, and control the 
environment. In other words, they anticipated flux and reacted prior to its 
occurrence. In this way, they attempted to head off the uncertainty, thus the finding 
that “anticipatory” organizations are capable of creating their own future state.  This 
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important in the network setting.  As discussed further below, anticipatory activities 
may perturb neighbors.  Despite all the research, the question that Ansoff posed in 
1979 remains valid: How do we configure the resources of the firm for effective 
response to unanticipated surprises? He pointed out that the “strategy of structure” 
had largely been ignored. In many ways, his question, while not ignored, remains 
unanswered.   
B. Adaptive Capacity 
Much of the literature has focused on an organization’s adaptation capabilities 
to changing environmental conditions. Under stable conditions, organizational 
partners can establish mutually acceptable arrangements.  Recall that under stable 
environmental conditions, organizations can also rely on hierarchical organizational 
structures.  Rather, in the face of demand uncertainty and environmental flux, 
organizations demand flexibility, or the ability to adapt to the stimuli.  Oftentimes, 
these adaptations perturb external relationships that then set off feedback loops to 
accommodate to the changes.  As an example, program managers establish multi-
year financial forecasts on how much money they will receive from Congress for 
their program.  When an unexpected shortfall occurs, the program must scale back.  
In a network context, not only does the scale-back influence the individual program, 
but it could also influence all of the program’s partners, causing them to have to 
accommodate for their partner’s shortfall.  In the acquisition arena, in which 
programs are interdependent, the inability to accurately predict future state, effect, 
and response needs can manifest in cost, schedule, and performance fluctuations. 
Apparently, an organization’s capacity to address environmental uncertainty 
depends on the absorptive capacity of its members (Cohen & Levinthal, p. 131).  By 
1990, Cohen and Levinthal had refined some of their thinking and argued that an 
organization’s absorptive capacity is not resident in any single individual but 
depends on the link across a mosaic of individual capabilities that are often 
internalized via routines, histories and stories, documentation, procedures, and 
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creative and innovative behaviors in a network of interdependencies.  Stacey (2002) 
called for the need to establish spontaneous changeability—downward and upward 
spirals in which feedback loops act to amplify existing behaviors.   
Comfort’s (1994) work indicated that organizations can be quite successful at 
rearranging and reforming configurations of operation in mutual adaptation to the 
changing needs and capacities of their environmental components. She found that 
organizations were capable of mutually adapting to the changing demands and 
opportunities imposed by the environment. The distinguishing characteristic of this 
process is that it occurs as a result of communication, selection, and adaptation 
processes within the system itself and between the evolving system and its 
environment (Comfort, 1994; Kaufmann, 1993).  
In considering interdependent organizations, Levinthal (1997) argued that 
each individual’s payoff function depended on the choices that other external actors 
make, so each individual’s adaptive landscape—the mapping of behavior to realized 
outcomes—is constantly shifting.  In this way, interdependencies form complex 
adaptive systems that evolve over time through the entry, exit, and transformation of 
other actors. Because the linkages evolve over time, the configuration and strength 
of the interconnections is in constant flux. Closely tied to the concept of bounded 
rationality (March & Simon, 1958), because of an inability to forecast system-level 
consequences, individuals optimize for their own gain rather than that of the 
collective network. Kauffman’s (1993) adaptive landscape metaphor (borrowed from 
Wright, 1931) suggested that organizations co-evolve on a fitness landscape to a 
state poised between order and chaos. The landscape on which actors adapt 
continually shifts because the payoffs of individual agents depend on the choices 
that other actors make (Levinthal, 1997, McPherson & Ranger-Moore, 1991).  
C. Complexity 
Complex adaptive systems, when defined by interdependent relationship 
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environment. The adaptation can take a variety of forms, from immobility on one 
extreme to chaos on the other. A static or immobile state reflects the inability of the 
relationship to adapt the necessary policies, procedures, or activities to address 
environmental perturbations. Conversely, the chaotic state represents a hyper-
turbulent response to environmental flux. An understanding of the adaptation 
configurations of these complex relationships carries important implications for 
management. Goals and objectives as well as capital and opportunity costs are 
inherently tied to potential activities of adaptation.  
The study of adaptive behaviors has led many to argue that organizations 
never achieve equilibrium, and thus, they investigate behavior from a nonlinear and 
dynamic perspective.  The recognition of the existence of network externalities 
signifies a growth in organizational complexity. How to deal with the complexity is 
another matter.  Apparently, managers can choose to absorb the complexity, reduce 
the complexity, or discard the complexity.  Their choice is thought to be a result of 
how they frame and label the complexity.  Interestingly enough, a recent speech by 
Mr. Gary Bliss on Root Cause Analysis identified that much of the failure of 
programs to be delivered on time, on cost, and at the desired performance level is 
due to incorrect framing of the initiative at the outset.  Managers discard or avoid 
complexity oftentimes when information is ambiguous or prone to diverse 
interpretations.  Yet, others argue that the hectic, multitasking world has led to 
collective attention deficit disorder.  In networks, information asymmetries can be a 
powerful force that leads to group dysfunctions including self-silencing, error 
amplification, and group-think.   
Unfortunately, previous research has also illustrated that adaptive behaviors 
can cascade in unexpected ways and thus, can have a tremendous impact on the 
achievement of critical goals and the final costs associated with any organizational 
activity.  Despite Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) seminal article some 20 years ago on 
absorptive capacity, scholars argued that the “emergence of absorptive capacity 
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antecedents remain unclear” (Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). Scholars and 
practitioners alike quickly identified that the complexity associated with a given 
objective wrested in the actual links that tied the organizations together.  They also 
discovered that as individual organizations sought to change their procedures to 
circumvent environmental flux, they actually created instability for others.   
D. Cost and Performance 
Given the overt focus on network relations, transaction cost economics 
dovetails quite nicely with network theory because it is primarily concerned with the 
costs that arise from the exchange of resources.  In the economics arena, the point 
where the transaction, or hand-off, occurs has not been considered a cost—the 
reason being that the “buyer” saw a return on investment, else they would defect or 
leave the relationship.  Other research has argued that some asymmetries may 
abound, thus leading to some iniquities.  However, it has been widely held that these 
iniquities are minimal at best.  More recently, however, these assumptions have 
been challenged.  Apparently, whether the ties are technological or social (and most 
times, they are both), transaction costs will accrue. 
According to Williamson (1981), transaction costs arise from (1) bounded 
rationality, (2) asset specificity, and (3) opportunism. The lifeblood of interdependent 
activities is coordination.  The more ties, the greater the coordination demands.  
Hence, Jones et al. (1997) claim that networks exist via a complicated dance of 
mutual adjustment and communication (p. 916).  High adaptation and coordination 
needs tend to trigger safeguarding.  In other words, agency behaviors arise. With a 
need to prioritize individual interests, conscious agency, or self-serving, activity is 
not unexpected.  Network nodes also experience differential, and unbalanced, 
advantages and disadvantages.  Thus, ties are often created, dissolved, or modified 
in terms of their strength or content as conditions change. 
In trying to determine absolute cost, the determination of the true value chain 
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vertical chains, thus leading to wide gaps in understanding the cost of horizontal 
relationships. Theoretically, joint capabilities should provide significant defense 
advantages. From the battlefield perspective, joint capabilities should promote 
greater situational awareness and thus reduce the risk of fratricide (i.e., “friendly 
fire”). An improved understanding of the location of various Service resources should 
also allow battlefield commanders to tap a wider range of arsenal assets. From a 
support perspective, joint capabilities should allow support agencies to improve their 
understanding of where various resources are located and how to leverage them to 
assist battlefield operations. Furthermore, from a command perspective, joint 
capabilities should improve understanding of the available resources that can be 
leveraged and enable a greater understanding of how to mitigate enemy threats. 
Yet, little is known about the cost or the risk that organizations encounter in 
these highly interdependent complex structures.  For the most part, the research is 
anecdotal at best and in search of a theoretical framework.  This research seeks to 
examine the influence of interdependencies on program performance.  In short, it 
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III. Research Questions 
In summary, the demand uncertainty of current defense threats has triggered 
a need to establish a battlefield in which resources are plentiful and available in a 
timely manner.  These needs require a transformation in how acquisition efforts have 
transpired in the past.  Acquisition efforts must now incorporate the network 
capabilities that are capable of serving the warfighter.  
Network approaches require a fundamental shift in how organizational 
performance has been understood in the past.  It requires new appreciation for 
environmental uncertainty, adaptability, cost, performance, and sustainability.  This 
research seeks to identify the influence that interdependent activities exert on 
program performance.  The research seeks to 
1. identify and characterize the nature of MDAP interdependencies; 
2. test to see if program cost correlates with any of the interdependency 
characteristics; 
3. isolate the extent to which acquisition performance breaches (i.e., per 
unit cost growth, schedule delays, and feature shortfalls) in an 
upstream program cascade to downstream interdependent MDAP 
programs; and 
4. compute overall annual MDAP network metrics of complexity dating 
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IV. Research Methods 
The sample for the research was all active major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs) between the 2005–2011 time period.  The data for the analysis 
are derived from select acquisition reports (SAR) and defense acquisition executive 
summary (DAES) reports.  
Two major sets of analyses were employed to meet the research objectives.  
First, the research tested to see whether interdependence influenced an MDAP’s 
cost or schedule performance.  In this way, the MDAPs were considered from an 
“ego” individual-level perspective (see pages 3 and 8). Interdependency was 
measured in three ways.  The first was a count of the number of program elements 
that funded the MDAP.  The number of program elements that funded an MDAP was 
used as a proxy for budget interdependence.  The second interdependency captures 
the number of data connections that characterizes an MDAP.  In the DAES report, at 
the start of the program, managers were asked to identify all of the critical external 
data interdependencies.  The data connection variable is a count of the external data 
interdependencies.  The third interdependency variable is measured as a dummy 
variable that indicates whether a given program is deemed officially “joint” by the 
DoD.  These three types of interdependencies are examined as follows for their 
influence on individual program performance.  Per the preceding discussion, these 
variables provide an indicator of structural embeddedness. 
The second set of questions related to perturbations or cascading effects.  
Because the shared budget network and the data-sharing network was captured at 
the individual program level, network renderings could be obtained for each year 
under study.  Employing a dyadic analysis data structure, each program was tested 
for a cascading effect. In short, it is not uncommon for a program to have a number 
of different types of interdependencies and, thus, the need to consider program 
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evolution of the shared budget network over time.  The data flow network was 
considered stable over time. 
Several control variables were incorporated into the analysis: development 
estimate (proxy for size), program stage (proxy for age), the previous year’s growth 
rate (proxy for past performance), and finally, a variable to capture variance over 
time.  These variables were included in the models because they were seen as 
potentially influencing the program’s performance. 
Five performance-based variables served as the dependent variables: 
1. annual percent unit cost growth from the previous year,  
2. annual percent procurement cost growth from the previous year,  
3. annual percent engineering cost variance from the previous year,  
4. annual percent estimation cost variance from the previous year, and  
5. annual percent schedule cost variance from the previous year.  
The cost variance metrics were tested because they are often monitored as a 
risk indicator.  The results of the analyses are presented as follows.  Multilevel mixed 
modeling was the technique of first choice.  However, the between subject variance 
was basically zero so ordinary least squares was employed. 
Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviations for each variable 
employed in the study.  In short, 16% of the programs were considered joint and 
57% of the programs were in production.  The annual average procurement unit cost 
(APUC) overrun was 7%, and the average annual program acquisition unit cost 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
N  Min  Max  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Number of Program Elements  865 0 33.00 2.46  3.47
Pct APUC Growth  456 ‐57.41 1108.94 6.53  56.70
Pct PAUC growth  501 ‐57.22 10146.15 29.23  458.23
Number of Data Connections  865 101 831.00 341.59  137.26
Development Estimate  477 183.76 178478.70 12158.75  23109.00
Percent Engineering Cost 
Variance  578 ‐9.84 17.57 0.15  1.35
Percent Estimating Cost 
Variance  578 ‐47.65 48.61 0.33  3.74
Percent Schedule Cost 
Variance  578 ‐17.11 8.51 0.03  1.05
Number of Programs Sharing 
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V. Findings 
A. Individual Level Effects 
Per Tables 3-7, only one of the interdependency variables illustrated 
significance and with only one of the dependent variables. Number of program 
elements influenced engineering cost variance in a positive direction.  Hence, the 
greater the number of program elements, the greater the engineering cost variance.   
Three other relationships were also noted.  PAUC and APUC growth 
appeared related, and the previous year’s percent estimating cost variance 
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: Pct PAUC Growth 






.360 B Beta   
(Constant) 4.771   .674
Number of Data Connections -.503 -.027 .605
Number of Program Elements -.071 -.003 .959
Joint Status -4.916 -.024 .628
Previous Year's Pct PAUC Growth .209 .046 .315
Pct APUC Growth .802 .613 .000
Pct Engineering Cost Variance -.154 -.003 .953
Pct Estimating Cost Variance .808 .024 .608
Pct Schedule Cost Variance -.081 -.001 .991
Development Estimate .000 -.003 .962
Stage -3.362 -.019 .689
Year 2006 17.559 .082 .141
Year 2009 -.260 -.001 .982
Year 2010 -.385 -.002 .974
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Table 4. Dependent Variable: Pct APUC Growth 






.360 B Beta   
(Constant) 6.722   .450
Number of Data Connections .020 .001 .979
Number of Program Elements -.072 -.004 .947
Joint Status -.137 -.001 .986
Previous Year's APUC Growth -.008 -.002 .959
Pct PAUC Growth .462 .606 .000
Pct Engineering Cost Variance .203 .005 .921
Pct Estimating Cost Variance -1.915 -.074 .120
Pct Schedule Cost Variance -1.469 -.013 .783
Development Estimate .000 -.016 .765
Stage -7.035 -.052 .284
Year 2006 -5.646 -.034 .549
Year 2009 4.116 .025 .657
Year 2010 13.523 .084 .142
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Table 5. Dependent Variable: Pct Engineering Cost Variance 






.016 B Beta   
(Constant) -.113   .642
Number of Data Connections .015 .050 .429
Number of Program Elements .085 .194 .002
Joint Status .071 .021 .726
lagPct Engineering Cost 
Variance 
-.005 -.004 .937
Pct PAUC Growth .000 -.021 .759
Pct APUC Growth .000 .009 .899
Pct Estimating Cost Variance .034 .068 .226
Pct Schedule Cost Variance -.051 -.023 .686
Development Estimate .000 -.140 .028
Stage -.033 -.012 .837
Year 2005 .041 .010 .883
Year 2006 .323 .085 .213
Year 2007 -.128 -.036 .599
Year 2009 -.001 .000 .996
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Table 6. Dependent Variable: Pct Estimating Cost Variance 






.059 B Beta   
(Constant) 1.187   .023
Number of Data Connections -.006 -.009 .885
Number of Program Elements -.032 -.040 .579
Joint Status -.066 -.011 .875
Previous Year’s Pct Estimating 
Cost Variance 
.179 .206 .001
Pct PAUC Growth .001 .035 .645
Pct APUC Growth -.005 -.130 .090
Pct Engineering Cost Variance .217 .127 .046
Pct Schedule Cost Variance .159 .037 .544
Development Estimate .000 -.001 .989
Stage -.665 -.116 .068
Year 2005 -.520 -.040 .542
Year 2006 -.996 -.133 .071
Year 2007 -.315 -.047 .532
Year 2009 .539 .083 .268
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Table 7. Dependent Variable: Pct Schedule Cost Variance 






.028 B Beta   
(Constant) .191   .043
Number of Data Connections -.007 -.054 .383
Number of Program Elements -.002 -.012 .846
Joint Status .024 .017 .775
Previous Year’s Pct Schedule 
Cost Variance 
.031 .030 .568
Pct PAUC Growth .000 -.036 .592
Pct APUC Growth .001 .078 .239
Pct Engineering Cost Variance -.009 -.021 .691
Pct Estimating Cost Variance .049 .225 .000
Development Estimate .000 -.009 .889
Stage -.084 -.069 .203
Year 2005 -.026 -.015 .811
Year 2006 -.086 -.055 .408
Year 2009 -.029 -.019 .777
Year 2010 -.073 -.048 .473
Year 2011 -.053 -.033 .613
 
B. Cascades 
The second set of models sought to isolate the extent to which 
interdependent MDAPs influence each other’s growth rate.  This set of tests sought 
to isolate whether the upstream program’s growth influenced their first order 
downstream counterpart. As mentioned previously, two networks are tested: a data 
connection network and a shared budget network.  The data network is a sequential 
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determine how upstream programs exhibited influences on downstream nearest 
neighbors.  
The budget network was an undirected network.  A network rendering of the 
MDAP–program element relationship discussed previously provided the ability to 
identify all of the programs that a given MDAP shared a budget with. Hence, the 
programs share a budget-level interdependency. The budget network is an example 
of what Thompson (1967) referred to as a “pooled” relationship, meaning that the 
network shows the programs that are interconnected via a shared budget; there is 
no direction to the tie or link.  So the analysis sought to determine the following: if 
one program had cost growth, would it cascade to the shared budget neighbors?  
The cascades were tested on the five dependent variables of interest while also 
controlling for key program characteristics.   
To determine the effect of the cascade, several variables were included in the 
model as controls.  Because the goal was to see how upstream programs influence 
their downstream counterparts, controlling for factors that might influence the 
downstream program’s growth rate became imperative.  Consequently, the following 
controls were added to the model: number of data connections, number of programs 
with shared budgets, joint status, previous year’s growth, and development estimate.   
Five key upstream influences were tested for influencing the downstream 
program performance in both the data and budget networks: 
1. upstream percent PAUC growth, 
2. upstream percent APUC growth, 
3. upstream percent engineering cost variance, 
4. upstream percent estimating cost variance, and 
5. upstream percent schedule cost variance. 
Table 8 provides the results of the analysis.  Note that the data and budget 
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Table 8. Interdependency Cascades 




Dependent Variable: Downstream Pct PAUC 
Growth 
Adj R Square .162  .158 
  B Beta Sig. B BBeta Sig. 
(Constant) 24.585  .83  -173.60   .24
Downstream Number of 
Data Connections 
28.84 .15 .000  41.61 .22 .000
Downstream Number of 
Program Elements 
-29.52 -.10 .01  -22.97 -.123 .09
Downstream Joint 
Status 
401.60 .16 .000  284.04 .131 .09
Downstream Prev Year 
Pct PAUC Growth 
-3.66 -.03 .29  -5.261 -.059 .27
Upstream Pct PAUC 
Growth 
2.45 .137 .009  27.40 .28 .003
Upstream Pct APUC 
Growth 
-1.94 -.020 .703  -19.23 -.18 .044
Upstream Pct Eng Cost 
Variance 
-132.69 -.106 .002  105.06 .17 .001
Upstream Pct Est Cost 
Variance 
-16.26 -.02 .52  -60.38 -.10 .061
Upstream Pct Schedule 
Cost Variance 
-128.10 -.03 .34  -43.01 -.02 .68
Downstream 
Development Estimate 
-.004 -.101 .010  .002 .03 .55
Stage -178.79 -.07 .04  -61.88 -.03 .56
Year 2006 -22.20 -.008 .85  -26.49 -.01 .87
Year 2009 14.97 .005 .898  -21.66 -.009 .880
Year 2010 -4.00 -.001 .973  77.45 .031 .604






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 35 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Data Network Shared Budget 
Network 
 Dependent Variable: Downstream Pct APUC 
Growth 
Adj R Square .061   .079 
  B Beta Sig.  B Beta Sig. 
(Constant) 5.718   .004  4.221   .111
Downstream Number of Data 
Connections 
.144 .049 .301  .313 .086 .139
Downstream Number of 
Program Elements 
-.813 -.192 .000  -.295 -.08 .293
Downstream Joint Status -1.323 -.034 .504  -7.608 -.19 .026
Downstream Previous Year's 
Pct APUC Growth 
-.058 -.059 .131  -.018 -.02 .703
Upstream Pct PAUC Growth .011 .031 .584  .006 .00 .964
Upstream Pct APUC Growth -.099 -.068 .239  -.054 -.05 .395
Upstream Pct Eng Cost 
Variance 
1.547 .047 .222  -1.697 -.09 .097
Upstream Pct Est Cost 
Variance 
.171 .015 .704  .077 .008 .898
Upstream Pct Schedule Cost 
Variance 
.598 .010 .802  4.646 .066 .249
Downstream Development 
Estimate 
.000 .044 .312  .000 .030 .630
Stage -3.307 -.092 .028  -1.501 -.04 .438
Year 2005 -6.177 -.102 .018  -13.46 -.22 .000
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 Data Network Shared Budget 
Network 
 Dependent Variable: Downstream Pct Engineering 
Cost Variance 
Adj R Square .134 .217 
  B Beta Sig.  B Beta Sig. 
(Constant) -.212   .330  -.277   .177
Downstream Number of Data 
Connections 
-.008 -.023 .598  -.023 -.078 .138
Downstream Number of 
Program Elements 
.075 .155 .000  .114 .399 .000
Downstream Joint Status .001 .000 .994  .131 .040 .567
Downstream Previous Year's 
Pct Engineering 
-.024 -.021 .573  -.095 -.042 .414
Upstream Pct PAUC Growth .004 .147 .004  -.004 -.029 .607
Upstream Pct APUC Growth -.016 -.101 .050  .000 .001 .988
Upstream Pct Eng Cost 
Variance 
.408 .209 .000  -.034 -.042 .405
Upstream Pct Est Cost 
Variance 
-.026 -.021 .574  -.104 -.113 .027
Upstream Pct Schedule Cost 
Variance 
-.224 -.033 .363  -.377 -.059 .227
Downstream Development 
Estimate 
.000 -.092 .021  .000 -.072 .184
Stage .299 .075 .056  .153 .053 .319
Year 2005 .106 .017 .691  .041 .008 .886
Year 2006 1.135 .189 .000  .251 .056 .322
Year 2007 -.086 -.017 .699  -.085 -.022 .694
Year 2009 -.026 -.006 .900  -.055 -.014 .798
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 Data Network Shared Budget 
Network 
 Dependent Variable: Downstream Pct 
Estimating Cost Variance 
Adj R Square .148  .039 
  B Beta Sig.  B Beta Sig. 
(Constant) .759   .020  .788   .008
Downstream Number of Data 
Connections 
-.040 -.093 .052  .031 .101 .135
Downstream Number of 
Program Elements 
-.026 -.044 .372  -.029 -.103 .234
Downstream Joint Status .167 .030 .562  .450 .134 .153
Downstream Previous Year's 
Pct Estimating 
.293 .311 .000  .027 .037 .577
Upstream Pct PAUC Growth .001 .026 .677  -.008 -.056 .586
Upstream Pct APUC Growth -.010 -.049 .433  .010 .064 .540
Upstream Pct Eng Cost 
Variance 
.040 .017 .675  -.095 -.110 .089
Upstream Pct Est Cost 
Variance 
.034 .020 .632  -.015 -.015 .827
Upstream Pct Schedule Cost 
Variance 
.503 .063 .117  .664 .107 .087
Downstream Development 
Estimate 
.000 -.011 .800  .000 -.057 .411
Stage -.478 -.089 .042  -.257 -.078 .275
Year 2005 .120 .005 .912  -.672 -.082 .228
Year 2006 -.294 -.038 .434  -.719 -.130 .070
Year 2007 -.175 -.028 .573  -.530 -.129 .070
Year 2009 1.574 .268 .000  -.340 -.079 .282
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 Data Network Shared Budget 
Network 
 Dependent Variable: Downstream Pct 
Schedule Cost Variance 
Adj R Square .018    -.016 
     
  B Beta Sig.  B Beta Sig.
(Constant) .136   .008  .136   .071
Downstream Number of Data 
Connections 
-.003 -.035 .436  -.001 -.006 .916
Downstream Number of 
Program Elements 
.003 .026 .561  .006 .065 .383
Downstream Joint Status -.028 -.027 .568  -.125 -.123 .113
Downstream Previous Year's 
Pct Schedule 
.116 .110 .003  .028 .037 .497
Upstream Pct PAUC Growth .000 -.036 .482  .001 .028 .655
Upstream Pct APUC Growth .000 .011 .833  .000 .004 .951
Upstream Pct Eng Cost 
Variance 
-.018 -.037 .315  .012 .044 .424
Upstream Pct Est Cost 
Variance 
.002 .008 .836  .004 .013 .821
Upstream Pct Schedule Cost 
Variance 
-.049 -.029 .425  -.011 -.010 .848
Downstream Development 
Estimate 
.000 -.050 .215  .000 -.092 .125
Stage -.112 -.117 .003  -.109 -.116 .049
Year 2005 -.037 -.024 .560  -.019 -.012 .841
Year 2006 .011 .008 .846  .002 .001 .985
Year 2009 .043 .037 .414  .072 .061 .340
Year 2010 .085 .073 .103  .002 .002 .978
Year 2011 .029 .020 .638  -.016 -.012 .846
 
In both the data and budget networks, upstream percent PAUC growth 
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percent PAUC growth also yielded a positive influence on downstream engineering 
cost variance for the data network. 
Upstream percent APUC growth exerted a negative influence on downstream 
PAUC percent growth in the budget network and downstream engineering cost 
variance in the data network. 
Upstream percent engineering cost variance had a negative influence on 
downstream percent PAUC growth in the data network but a positive influence in the 
budget network. It also exerted a positive influence on downstream percent 
engineering cost variance in the data network. 
Upstream percent estimation cost variance and schedule cost variance 
illustrated no relationships with any of the models.  A number of the control variables 
also illustrated statistical significance.  In these models, the interdependency 
variables were significant predictors of unit growth. The number of data connections 
and joint status was related to unit growth in a positive direction.  The number of 
data connections was also positive and significant in the shared budget network.  In 
the data network, the number of program elements was significant on unit cost 
growth but in a negative direction.   
On procurement cost growth, the number of program elements had a 
negative influence in the data network and joint status had a negative influence on 
procurement growth in the shared budget network.  Stage (0 = development; 1= 
production) was significant in a negative direction in every model.  Hence, as 
programs move from development to production, they experience less ill-toward 
growth. The previous year’s percent estimating cost variance was predictive of the 
current year’s estimating cost variance as was the previous year’s schedule cost 
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C. Conclusion 
Network-based organizations are proving more pivotal in situations where 
demand uncertainty runs high.  Despite the fact that they are occurring with greater 
frequency, their influence on program performance remains unknown.  Of utmost 
concern is the adaptive needs that accompany interdependent organizations. 
Theoretically, interdependence may yield high levels of environmental uncertainty for 
unsuspecting interconnected programs.  The environmental uncertainty is likely to 
reveal itself in the way of unanticipated cost growth.   
This research examined the influence of a number of interdependencies on 
program performance.  The issue of environmental turbulence was central to the 
research. The analysis looked at all active MDAPs during the 2005–2011 time 
frame.  It found that interdependencies (when defined by “joint status,” “number of 
program elements,” or “number of data connections”) do not appear to exhibit any ill-
toward effects on the individual program.  In short, outside of the influence of the 
number of program elements on engineering cost variance, none of the 
interdependency variables appeared to influence the individual program’s 
performance. 
The same does not hold for the cascades.  Upstream unit cost growth had a 
significant and positive influence over the downstream program’s unit growth.  
Interestingly, the upstream’s engineering cost variance demonstrated a negative 
influence on downstream unit cost in the data network but it reversed itself in the 
shared budget network, demonstrating a significant positive relationship.  Similar 
results held when examining the downstream program’s engineering cost variance. 
The findings are particularly noteworthy because they show the influence of 
interdependencies in two types of networks: a sequential data network and a pooled 
budget network.  By the sheer number of positive relationships to cost or cost 
variance growth, the sequential data network illustrated greater susceptibility than its 
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effects on unit cost growth and engineering cost variance for both networks is 
particularly troubling.  DoD programs are under increasing pressure to reduce cost 
growth, much of which occurs due to changes in the engineering arena.   
Also of interest is the finding that joint status only appears to influence 
downstream unit growth.  The fact that the number of program elements was 
negatively related to both unit cost and procurement cost is intriguing.  This signal 
may illustrate that some sort of economies of scale are being witnessed through the 
arrangement. 
The findings of this research call attention to the role of environmental 
uncertainty in interdependent activities.  The findings illustrate that the performance 
of interdependent organizations are susceptible to the performance shortfalls of their 
partners.  While the results demonstrated statistical significance, closer examination 
of the data revealed that some programs appear to be more susceptible to their 
upstream partners than others.  The examination of why some programs may be 
more susceptible to their partners was beyond the scope of this research.  Given 
these results, why a given program may be more or less immune is, thus, a topic 
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